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“What speaks is just about solitude…”
Encore Seminar, Jacques Lacan
Paradoxical solitude
We have chosen these two terms, solitude: common, separated in this case by 
a colon, which implies a relationship of conjunction and disjunction between 
the two terms, or a ‘sameness’ in the difference. From this solitude: common 
formula, in the present essay we will present the possible relationships between 
the analytic discourse elaborated by Jacques Lacan and the political thinking 
that may eventually rise from it.
The term solitude comes directly from Lacan’s teaching, since he uses it, al-
though on few occasions, to make reference to the solitude of the subject within 
its empty constitution. The Lacanian subject emerges as emptiness, without 
substance and without the possibility of being represented in its totality by the 
signifiers that establish it. Its solitude is radical, as long as no ‘intersubjective’ or 
‘loving’ relationship can definitely eliminate that empty and exceptional space. 
This empty space is assigned to be filled with those signifiers that represent, 
identify, or fix it in accordance with certain ideals or mandates, according to dif-
ferent operations. At the same time, this subject without substance, empty in its 
essence, is also called on to imagine a possible completeness through different 
fantasy strategies that are more determinately aimed at veiling that structural 
emptiness. Nonetheless, this subject we are speaking about here, the Lacanian 
subject, is unthinkable without its relationship to the Other that logically pre-
cedes it. The solitude of the subject does not come from a solipsism in which it is 
able to found itself through a reflexive act that positions itself before the world. 
It is not a solitude which comes from any potency that the subject itself may 
have to constitute. Its solitude, on the contrary, results from the fact that even 
though the subject is constituted in the Other’s field, its mode of emergency is 
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such that it is impossible that it can establish a stable, definite, common quali-
ty-based relationship, with the Other symbolic-partner that actually constitutes 
it. The Lacanian subject’s solitude is equivalent to its structural dependence in 
relation to the place of the Other which does not allow for the establishment of 
a common ontological foundation. Even though the subject’s life stands in its 
existential orientation as devoted to the Other, supported by the Other, opposed 
to the Other, rejected by the Other, loved by the Other, claimed by the Other, 
desired, humiliated, etc., these different positions always belong to a fantasy 
order that inscribes itself in an ontological gap constituted by the absence of 
relationship. 
In contrast, the classic term ‘common’ does not arise in Lacan’s teaching, not 
even in a metaphorical way. The ‘common’, as termed by Negri and Hardt, has 
in general, in most authors, an ontological origin with a deep Deleuzian mark. 
When talking about the ‘common’, Negri refers to a potency which is unlimited, 
cognitive, affectionate, which refers to intellectual work, and is singular, in the 
sense that it is transversal to the particular-universal relationship. This singu-
larity reaches its extreme when it is seen as being able to ‘produce’ a different 
subjectivity from that deployed under the merchandise form in a capitalist pro-
duction mode.   
From a Lacanian point of view, it must be clarified from the outset that terms 
such as ‘production’, ‘potency’, ‘life’, terms that come from the so-called ‘desir-
ing-production of the Deleuzian field’, constitute an ‘oblivion’, a rejection of the 
ontological dimension of the emptiness of the subject, in its paradoxical solitary 
constitution in relation to the Other. That is why we are obliged in this text to 
find for this term ‘common’ a Lacanian logic, different from the one established 
in Negri’s Deluzian construction. In the Lacanian ‘common’ that we seek to deal 
with here, the gap, the ontological hiatus, should manifest itself in all its con-
sequences. There is no potency, no production, no life that is not interrupted by 
the ‘cause’ of this ontological fracture.   
Yet in trying to cope with these two terms, we find in the relationship between 
them a privileged way of articulating the singular condition of the subject and 
the collective dimension of politics. To say it in a slightly Heideggerian way, 
‘common’ and ‘solitude’ refer to and name the same ontological hiatus, the 
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same irreducible gap, and come from the same signifier matrix in which they 
constitute each other. 
Not knowing and collective experience
Lacan cannot be more explicit regarding solitude. In the Encore Seminar, once 
the logical impossibility of the sexual relationship has been established, he 
states that the only thing that is ‘effectively written’ in the speaking being is 
solitude. Perhaps that is the reason why he claimed with his known sarcasm 
that he was not lacking reasons to laugh, but someone to share it with. Without 
a shadow of a doubt, this statement about the radically solitary character of 
he who talks at his own risk presents one of the typical tensions that traverses 
the psychoanalysis and politics relationship. Namely, as we have already formu-
lated, on the one hand, a strictly singular character, in solitude and without pos-
sible equivalents, of the advent of the subject to a speaking, sexed, and mortal 
existence; and, on the other hand, as Lacan himself presents it, this singularity 
can only become intelligible in a collective logic that he develops using differ-
ent names throughout his teaching. From the already mentioned Other’s field 
that, as is known, always refers to a symbolic order, to his theory of discourses, 
where each of them always presents a particular structure according to their 
own conditions of emergence, since within them such heterogeneous elements 
as signifiers and drives co-imply one another in a paradoxical logic. At the same 
time, this structure is transindividual as it never arises from the reflexive act of 
an already established consciousness, due to the constitutive potency of Mas-
ter signifiers, identifications, the ideals of a person, and super-ego instances, 
which assume a ‘collective’ form, as long as we understand ‘collective’ not as 
a quantity phenomenon, but as the matrix from which social bonds are consti-
tuted. Finally, all these issues may be summed up in the following statement: 
the first emergence of the subject is always within the so-called ‘Master’s dis-
course’. Although, regarding the ‘Master’s discourse’, we must assume that, in 
its contemporary forms, this discourse, which has always been supported under 
the insignia of permanence, lineages, time and duration, in short, symbolic her-
itage, at present sees itself badly eroded, volatilized, by the incessant corrosion 
of the unlimited circulation of merchandise. This, however, does not prevent the 
fact that the so called ‘Master signifiers’ still preserve their symbolic efficiency. 
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It is true that whenever Lacan talks about the position of the analyst in the act 
that implicates him in the cure, he refers in different ways to this solitude here 
evoked. Thus, to introduce solitude, or the solitary character of existence when 
bringing the unconscious into play in the experience of the cure, can be seen as 
the best way to address the problem that emerges when psychoanalysis is con-
fronted with the experience of the collective that politics always implies.  
The analysis, in the completion of the cure, radicalizes the experience of soli-
tude, as long as the subject manages to drift apart from the Master signifier, 
which constitutes the logical matrix of its identifications. This separation – 
which cannot be just considered as an erasure – allows the subject, at the same 
time, an unprecedented distance, a perspective in ‘anamorphosis’ on what is 
its own fantasy, which is always saturated with the constitutive potency of the 
Other’s figures. 
In this way, the subject in the experience of the end of analysis subverts the 
identifications that both dominated the it and abandon it to its surplus jouis-
sance. An example of this crossroads between solitude and the collective which 
Lacan himself faced would then be the following: how the end of the analysis 
would be articulated, an experience that is far away from an identification, with 
a collective construction of a School that would in no way present a space where 
the more inert and sedimented identities that are always promoted by the life of 
the institution itself would once more return. We should remember that Lacan 
had assumed as his own political challenge, as a cause that emerged from his 
own relationship with the experience in psychoanalysis, that the School would 
constitute itself as a collective experience that would not be dominated by the 
identifications supported by the Master signifier. 
For the same reason, Jacques Lacan’s School, defined by him as a basis of opera-
tions for the ‘discontents in civilization’, faces from the beginning the following 
questions: 
How is a subject that has succeeded in distancing itself from identifica-
tions incorporated into a collective instance? 




What is a group constituted by subjects who in a contingent way have 
traversed the level of identification? 
How is belonging organized away from identification and, therefore, from 
that which Freud called ‘mass psychology’? 
These questions refer to a problematic and difficult distinction between the col-
lective relationship with the cause and the ideal. Whereas the cause is the empty 
place from which the common can eventually be brought about in a contingent 
and retroactive way, the ideal is always an agglutination in masses that seals the 
invention of the political act of enunciation. It was precisely this problem that 
obliged Lacan to distinguish his School from analytic societies, as the latter are 
inevitably supported by the logics of identification. 
The ‘price’, if we are allowed this expression, which Lacan had to pay for conceiv-
ing a School that would work against the tide of identifications, was to conceive 
it as an inconsistent group, such as ‘not-all’, a concept that Lacan elaborated 
starting with the 20th Seminar, i.e. at the juncture when his ‘logic of sexuation’ 
was presented. Unlike a society ruled from its own centre by a knowledge capa-
ble of defining what a standard analyst is, that is, an analyst for all cases, Lacan 
states that his School is centred around an emptiness, a ‘not knowing’ that must 
be preserved by means of the School’s procedures, which should never erase or 
fulfil it definitely. When this emptiness is not localized in an appropriate way, 
its confusion with ‘nothingness’ and, finally, with ‘nullity’ arises. This explains, 
according to Lacan, why on many occasions ‘nullities’ are what end up standing 
at the command of institutions. 
Lacan designated this operation as the ‘confusion concerning zero’; that con-
fusion which is established between the non-numerical one of the emptiness 
marked by the signifier and the zero of quantity. Furthermore and recalling this 
Lacanian tension between the subject’s solitude and the collective construction 
of the School, this opens up the access to an example of the way that a trans-
formation of the subject can be conceived and, at the same time, where that 
transformation can succeed in bringing about a collective, new, and different 
relationship, with a cause. This new and different relationship with a cause, 
understood as an emptiness of ‘not knowing’, is what we propose to call ‘com-
mon’ in the text here presented. It is effectively a ‘common’ constituted topologi-
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cally by a central and, at the same time, external emptiness, a topological figure 
which Lacan refers to at different moments in his teaching.
This core function of both the emptiness of not-knowing and the possibility of 
the open and undecidable group of the non-identified, could be a possible start-
ing point which psychoanalysis may offer as a proposal to think the immanent 
logic of political transformation, even in its emancipatory condition, provided 
that it is not entirely dominated by the metaphysic of a homogenizing totality. 
Some time ago we published a short essay in Argentina: Para una izquierda la-
caniana... (For a Lacanian left…). In it we sought, in a conjectural way and in 
first person through ‘ellipses’ that appeared everywhere, to present the tension 
here evoked between psychoanalysis and politics, a tension that, in one’s own 
personal case as in many others, demands a reformulation of the classic ap-
proaches of the left.
Although at the beginning we stated, as is shown by means of the ellipsis in the 
title, that this was a speculation which did not try to found any point of identifi-
cation in its consistency, that there is not and cannot be a group, institution, or 
subject that can belong to something that is called the ‘Lacanian left’. Neverthe-
less, the syntagma in question took on a peculiar imaginary consistency and 
was refuted and rejected as if it were, for some, a new universal foundation of 
the leftist project; for others, a strategy to settle the left; for some others still, an 
attempt to turn Lacan into a leftist thinker.   
We let keen readers ponder for themselves the unusual fervour of all these re-
proaches, which were precisely clarified at the beginning of the text. The fact is 
that the words ‘left’ and ‘Lacanian’ are not meant to go together, since they come 
from fields that keep an insurmountable distance between them and, surely for 
that reason, the expression inevitably promotes various misunderstandings, 
which perhaps now reach a greater intensity when we seek to link the word ‘soli-
tude’ with the word common. But the desire to found any group or current has 
never existed, nor have we pretended to ignore all that which in Lacan’s teach-
ing poses an obstacle to the left’s illusions and promises, instead we have tried 
to make a new punctuation, availability, and opening which work alternatively 
in different senses. On the one hand, it should undermine usual leftist political 
stances destabilizing its semantics, still dominated by progressivism, utopia, 
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and revolution. Progressivism, utopia, and revolution being three representa-
tions that in their temporality and spatiality are still ruled by the metaphysics 
of the totality. In this metaphysics the process of transformation is orientated by 
an identifying logic that continues to maintain an exclusive relationship with 
the so-called mass psychology. In view of elucidating this issue, our speculation 
concernig the ‘Lacanian left’ proposal is an attempt to think of the possibility of 
a left stream that could have a space in this historic time in which metaphysics 
has completed its full itinerary. 
On the other hand, we have tried to broach, from the perspective of the analytic 
discourse and its experience of the real, the experience of the common, more 
precisely, to ask whether there is something in common preceding all the differ-
ences generated by traditions and cultural identifications. The common, we in-
sist, is to be seen not as the Deleuzian potentiality, but rather as the contingent 
response to the ontological hiatus that constitutes all speaking, sexed, and mor-
tal beings in the same way. At the same time, we have tried to renew the question 
concerning the possibility of a left-wing stance, if reasons such as the following 
are accepted: the division of the subject is sublation; the surplus jouissance is 
historically irreducible by any dialectics of overcoming; the labour of repetition 
of the death drive shatters the illusions of progress of any civilization; the poli-
tics and discourse of the Master maintain the will for the working of things; the 
revolution is the return of the same to the same place – sometimes with deadly 
consequences; the singularity of jouissance and desire, ultimately, cannot be 
subsumed under the ‘for all’ of the political thing of the Master.    
 
We could continue to quote other reasons regarding different aspects of Freud’s 
work and Lacan’s teaching which show us categorically how the so-called argu-
ments of the left are shattered in their ontologically more secure basis when 
facing the logic of the analytic discourse. At the same time, perhaps these kind 
of reasons are precisely the ones that would have provoked many Lacanians 
to abandon paths which have historically been designed by the left, and that 
philosophers were the ones who would look favourably upon Lacan, in order to 




If this is the case, why have we preferred the ‘Lacanian left’ formula that returns 
to the issue of the common, instead of inquiring about the subject’s solitude in 
any of its usual aspects? 
These aspects remind us that we are irreducibly alone when facing the ‘being 
there’ of our castration and finitude, and that the rest is just illusion. Yet, in 
spite of these considerations, we can still maintain left-wing ideas, not despite 
Lacan’s teaching, but owing to several drifts in his teaching that open up the 
possibility of a conception of post-metaphysical emancipation. We do not state 
that the paths of this teaching necessarily lead to a leftist stance. In fact, we can 
see some colleagues who, based on Lacanian arguments, have built a scepti-
cal perception in politics, or a lucid conservatism, or an ironical and diagonal 
reading of political phenomena. Thus, it is necessary to specify that, despite 
everything, relevant moments of the Lacanian itinerary form a resonance box 
promising to resound again, in all their modulation, the issues of the left. For 
that, we will present different aspects.
First of all, we claim that Marxism, as a desire, found a place in Lacan’s teach-
ing on mourning, starting from the assumption that outside the home is where 
mourning can be truly accomplished, and that this home can only be the unique 
20th century materialist theory urging us to continue to think of a practice that 
would work on the impossible real. Obviously, we are referring to Lacan’s teach-
ing. But, from this perspective, it is necessary to insist that the work of this 
mourning must have as a condition of possibility that the psychoanalysis-poli-
tics relationship, their bordering relationships of conjunction and disjunction, 
cannot be subsumed under the internal movement of philosophy. We do not 
seek to bring the real under the idea, as Badiou attempts to do, since in so doing, 
that is, in domesticating the Lacanian real in the guise of a Platonist idea, an at-
tempt is made, by means of a figure of the ‘immortal subject’, as defined by Ba-
diou, a subject, ultimately, ‘faithful to the process of truth’ and thus a guarantor 
of the entire operation, to dissolve once more the analytic discourse in philoso-
phy. This is particularly true of a philosophical ethics in which, again according 
to Badiou, only those who are ‘faithful and immortal’ thanks to the articulation 
of an idea, deserve the name of the subject. In view of this, Badiou’s theoreti-
cal project can be seen as a psychoanalysis without psychoanalysis, where this 
faithful and immortal subject, being already definitely identified with its sig-
nifying reality, conceals that it is but a dead subject. It is strange that Badiou, 
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knowing Lacan, does not realize that such an identity between the Subject and 
its symbol serves as a gravestone that perpetuates it in its name. 
The same can be said of Žižek, who, despite his psychoanalytical readings, al-
ways refers them to a pre-Lacanian philosophical problem of an emancipatory 
logic characterized as a conflict between the universal of reason and a univer-
sal embodied by the ‘excluded’, ‘those of the part without part’ – as defined by 
Rancière – who will always spontaneously know how to organize their coun-
terattack, which is to say, without any political intervention. In both stances, 
psychoanalysis becomes a guarantor of the philosophical operations and, for 
the same reason, it cannot become this new field where the process of mourning 
could be possible. A practice that works with the impossible real, and it is here 
that our proximity to Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical development can be seen, im-
plies that when the collective field emerges ontologically fractured, in the same 
conditions that the subject and, thus, hegemonic decisions come to occupy the 
place of the so called ‘objectivity’ – since they are the only ones which take re-
sponsibility for the fractures emerging from the real – the discourse of philoso-
phy has come to its end, not to its historical, datable ending, but to the ending 
experience concerning the constitution of a new frontier. In this philosophical 
end, in the space of its intimate exteriority, the political should appear. 
At the same time, it should be noted that these objectives are maintained with-
out any ground, in the classical sense of the term. Lacan cannot be the new 
ground for the left; on the contrary, he is its ‘disfoundation’ or, if you will, the 
demonstration that only the absent cause is really operative, never as a previ-
ously established option of knowing, but retroactively set by the series of events. 
It consists in a wager without the Other of the guarantee, yet leads us to neither 
Rorty’s ironical relativism, nor to the historicist constructivism of Foucaultian 
inspiration. The ontological gap, Lacan’s ‘crossed ontology’, renders possible a 
series of logical operations with the ‘half saying’ of truth, which work as ‘contin-
gent foundations’ or as ‘quasi transcendental’, allowing for the beginning of a 
far-reaching intelligibility. It does not consist in presenting a compact and con-
sistent narrative, since this is structurally incompatible with the real put into 
play in the operation. We may point out, however, that all the logical, topologi-
cal, and rhetorical conditions are present, to account for how speaking, sexed, 
and mortal existence is, within its own constitution, a political fact susceptible 
to being inscribed in a will of transformation.
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To refer to this inscription of the subject in a transforming will, it is inevitable to 
briefly mention the famous historical issue called ‘voluntary servitude’. 
Throughout these five centuries, this voluntary servitude presented by La Boétie 
has been reformulated in different ways, with different theoretical strategies, 
and pointing at different political problems. In any case, one thing is true: so-
called emancipation can be better imagined if it involves an ‘external oppres-
sion’, since in such circumstances a force that seems external and alien prevents 
the subject from realizing its own essence. We know that throughout the centu-
ries this modulated, with variations, the semantics of emancipation, namely, 
the liberation of a so-called force oppressed by the dominating interests. But 
what happens if one admits that, for various reasons, the oppression is not 
just external, that the Master is supported by the investment of the submissive 
and, yet, one does not want to give emancipation, justice, or equality up? The 
recourse to naïve belief in the emancipatory project does not make sense any 
longer; emancipation demands to be reinvented with what we already know of 
the subject and its relationship with the real. Here we have a typical problem of 
what we consider to be, in a speculative way, the ‘Lacanian left’. In this sense, 
for us, the very expression ‘will’ is problematic. What is a will that is different 
from that which has been put into play in totalitarian projects? What are the 
conditions to think of a will that has gained supports other than those that have 
been put to work in the sacrificial voluntarism of the left and in the heroic deci-
sionism of fascist tradition? We should remove the term will from the metaphys-
ics that presided over it in the 20th century and ask about the possibility of the 
emergence of a collective will, a will that is contingent, not planned in advance, 
and not inspired by ideals yet capable of breaking with the servitude circuit. 
This would require that we ask ourselves seriously about what a human col-
lective is capable of or wether it is just devoted to the identifying exaltation. Of 
course, when we think of will, we do not refer to the critical deliberation which 
the left of social democratic tradition refers to. Neither do we refer to some great 
collective act, but rather to an unprecedented series that conveys a new desire, a 
desire that retroactively invents its cause, because it does not need to have a pre-
given reason, in short, a desire that can be recognized in what Lacan in his day 
called a ‘decided desire’, being a logical support. As is well known, these terms 
were brought into play by Lacan in reference to the peculiarity of ‘case by case’ 
logic. It should be noted, however, that the notion of voluntary servitude refers 
to a collective issue; secondly, we would replace ‘peculiar’ with ‘singular’. The 
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emergence of a popular will is a singular political experience, and thus ‘univer-
sal’, although in Lacanian terms we speak of a fragmented universal, traversed 
by incompleteness and inconsistency. Taking up the term will, yet interpreted in 
accordance with the Lacanian logic of ‘decided desire’, we would insist that it is 
not possible to think of an even partial interruption of voluntary servitude. 
A Lacanian Left…
This proposal of a political will that would be grounded in the ‘decided desire’, 
reveals its true problematic extension if we consider that capitalism is described 
by Lacan as a circular unending movement, from which we cannot determine 
an exit point. Furthermore, we can neither name the setting where such exit 
point may be situated historically, nor that which will come after its consum-
mation. However, capitalism is not an eternal, necessary, quasi-natural reality, 
where the human condition reaches its final realization step. On the contrary, 
it is about affirming, once more, its contingency, and so the always possible ad-
vent of another way of ‘being with the others’ different from what is known in 
capitalism. Here lies the historical and unsurpassable tension that presides over 
the horizon of our political thinking.   
Finally, we would like to recall that being leftist is to consider that the exploita-
tion of the labour force carried out under the form of merchandise is an abuse of 
the absolute difference. It is quite different to accept the disturbing ‘homology’ 
between the surplus jouissance and the ‘surplus value’, the homology that in 
the final analysis leads us to think of the strange possibility, as was affirmed by 
Lacan himself at a certain point, of the fact that ‘the subject is always happy’ 
from the viewpoint of the solitude of its jouissance, that accepting exploitation 
as if within itself there were another feature of the necessary and eternal human 
condition, and, at present, a step away from being ‘founded’ by any cerebral 
disposition. The hierarchy of the market is not the difference, but a numerical 
and equivalential tergiversation. The praxis of psychoanalysis can engage in a 
conversation with the ontological difference only if it is interpreted in political 
terms. As we have stated before, at the end of philosophy, psychoanalysis and 
politics can present, in different ways, the logic that responds to the impossible 
real of the absolute difference.
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At this point it is interesting to observe in many contemporary philosophical op-
erations a presentation, on the one hand, of capitalism in its systemic condition, 
ruled by an unlimited circuit of the merchandise form and, at the same time, 
once this unlimited and without exterior character of capitalism is presented, 
the axiomatization of equality and the theoretical configuration of a communist 
hypothesis are presented to us without the need to account for the internal logi-
cal transformation of this passage.
We must insist that if there is an unmistakable specificity in the Lacanian ana-
lytical discourse, it is in his constant concern for putting the possibilities and 
impossibilities of the social links transformation to the test when the real of the 
surplus jouissance is in play. At the same time, sometimes some psychoanalysts 
themselves provoke a misunderstanding: since Lacan presented the capitalist 
discourse as a circular movement without any exterior break, where, in short, 
the subject gains access to its surplus jouissance without ever encountering any 
impossibility whatsoever, with this a new version is coined, in this case a La-
canian one, of a Kojèvian end of history presented as a totality without an op-
erational exterior, what Kojève together with Bataille would call ‘a terminating 
negativity’. In some essays Žižek draws inspiration from this view. 
Finally, talking about solitude today requires that we remember that although 
the discourse of the Master in its contemporary guise presents the fissures in its 
historical foundations that once served as semblance, it nevertheless preserves 
its function, that of concealing and veiling the singularity of the subject. By con-
trast, the subject in the radical solitude of the sinthome in the cure can invent 
another way of reading or interpreting the ‘for all’ that supports the world. And 
this is what we can consider as a political fact, in the more radical sense of the 
term, which is a way of stating that, regarding other theoretical stances of the 
provisionally called ‘Lacanian left’, our point of view is that what is more radi-
cal in Lacan’s teaching as regards political thinking lies in his elucidation of the 
experience of the cure and within the logical construction of his School. 
Common
What is the common, if the starting point is not the ‘for all’ that aims at an ideal 
point, a final point, utopian, without fractures or antagonisms, an order of a 
society reconciled with itself, as was believed historically by the classical left? 
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What is the common, if it is considered as that that emerges from the ‘there is 
no sexual relationship’, the common arising from the sinthomatic solitude that 
results from the unconscious, without dialectics or any overcoming? In other 
words, the common as the term where the absolute difference can come into 
play?
From this perspective, the names of the common come from the ‘there is not’: 
there is no sexual relationship, no metalanguage, no Other of the Other. At the 
same time, these three ‘there is not’ signal that a certain civilization, the capital-
ist one in this case, is not supported just by violent and exterior oppression, but 
also by the complicity of the subject in its fantasized and ideological response 
to the different ‘there is not’. Moreover, the ideology is the ‘fantasy’ outside the 
analytic experience. Social life is ruled by the fantasized response to these three 
‘there is not’ that speaking beings have in common. We propose, by contrast, 
to think of the common from the ‘there is no’ logic in order to open up a new 
possibility for the enigmatic ‘being with the others’ which, in his day, Heidegger 
left and replaced with the expression people, a romantic expression in his case, 
which always pretends to present itself as a fixed and stable identity, and which 
recently Laclau has re-established in its logical dignity since he considers the 
people as a hegemonic invention-construction produced through different dis-
cursive operations. 
Marx himself refused to think of the common because it supposed an already 
established assumption called ‘community’. It is in Lacan’s teaching, from the 
sinthomatic solitude, as that which is already inscribed in the ‘no relationship’, 
that we have the opportunity to understand the common from a new perspec-
tive. The common without an identitary basis, distinct from the homogenizing 
characteristics of capitalism, precidings all divisions of labour or bourgeois hi-
erarchies, irreducible to any utilitarian calculation of the semblances. Our com-
mon is what we can do together with the emptiness of that ‘there is not’. It is 
neither the characteristic that unifies us, nor the potentiality that constitutes us; 
the common is the singular of the sinthome, the solitude that invents the social 
link so that it becomes a political will. But the common considered in these new 
terms requires certain precisions: 
a) If Freud has always seen ‘mass psychology’ as a prolegomenon of totali-
tarianism, Lacan, by contrast, seeks to isolate a perspective of the common 
40
jorge alemán
which may be differentiated from the capitalist or totalitarian ‘for all’. A be-
ing together, a being with the others, in a project without guarantees, where 
the common is not already given but is rather conceived in terms of a contin-
gency that can be found in art, in love, in friendship, and in the specifically 
political order. We should remember that this experience of the common is 
possible when the sinthome of each of us names the radical and singular sol-
itude of the subject at the point at which it distances itself from the Other’s 
figures. What is important to note here is that when facing the impossibility 
of the sexual relationship, there is no attempt here to consider love as a sim-
ple veil concealing this impossibility. This is because, according to Lacan, 
the requirement of something true is always put into play whenever we deal 
with impossibility. The contingency that is capable to temporarily erase im-
possibility must have the dignity of an experience of transformation; and 
love, for Lacan, is situated within this perspective.  
What, then, is the only material evidence of this matrix of the common with 
which speaking beings have been connected? The materiality of the common 
comes from the link between the real with lalangue. There is no other ma-
trix of the common than that event which precedes the differences between 
what is taught and what is learned, between those who work and those who 
give orders, have been established, before grammar has been learned and 
good or bad schools been entered, and also precedes the ‘general intellect’ of 
Marxist reference, which is evoked by Italian philosophers.  
The solitary encounter with the real of lalangue, the first trauma, is paradoxi-
cally the only point that presents the existence of the common as that which 
escapes the homogenizing ‘for all’ of ‘mass psychology’. For this reason, this 
solitary encounter with the common of lalangue cannot be subsumed under 
either individualism or under the so-called private sphere. In fact, it consti-
tutes the vanishing point of those spheres, the point of their deconstruction. 
Perhaps, for these reasons, linguists and logicians who have been courageous 
enough to discern what is put into play in the first encounter with lalangue 
have never wished to abandon the project of emancipation, even when the 
latter appears to be shattered in its foundations and supported solely by its 
absent cause. Thus, the emancipatory narrative demands, and in this it fol-
lows the analytic discourse, that the common manifests itself not only in its 
incompleteness (belonging to the masculine logic), but also in its inconsist-
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ency (the sphere defined by the feminine logic). There cannot be a compact 
emancipatory narrative that seeks to erase the specific interruptions of the 
ontological hiatus and the contingent manifestation of impossibility. 
b) Sexed and mortal speaking existence belongs, in first place, to the not-all 
of the common and not to the universal, which is always supported by an 
exception. Being African, Arabian, Latin-American, belongs to the universal, 
which is always already a second derivation with respect to the first belong-
ing of the speaking being to the common of lalangue. This is what, to our 
mind, Lacan clearly sensed: what the excluded mass is deprived of is the 
possibility of transforming the traumatic, sinthomatic, and solitary encoun-
ter with lalangue into a social bond.
In a certain way, the subject can be included in a collective transformation 
process when perceiving that it is something more than its own identifica-
tions and, in so doing, it also faces, finally, its responsibility for the way of 
living in lalangue. 
The Not-All
Based on what has been developed thus far, namely, by translating the issue of 
solitude and ‘non relationship’ into the field of the common, we can suggest the 
following: 
a) The contemporary Master discourse nourishes the ‘for all’ with a mercan-
tile individualism that permeates the State itself, and only leaves a ‘sub-de-
velopment’ piled up in its surplus jouissance for the excluded. Thus, this ‘for 
all’ might be thought of as a fracture. Although the Master discourse’s aim is, 
ultimately, that the ‘everything works’, it cannot break free from the antago-
nisms constitutive of the political. This constitutive antagonism results from 
the division of the subject itself, a division between the sinthomatic common 
of lalangue and the figures that tie us to its Master signifiers. From such a per-
spective we can claim that the political arises from the real encounter with la-
langue, whereas politics is to be considered as a ‘know how’, yet one that im-
plies this encounter. In the encounter of the real with lalangue, the ‘for-all’ is 
rendered incomplete and thus becomes inconsistent. These are the moments 
when the experience of the common may let political invention occur.  
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b) But this political invention must still recognize the present metamorpho-
sis of the poverty conditions within the logic of the contemporary capitalist 
discourse. Namely: poverty is not just the deprivation of ‘material needs’, as 
Marx thought, but consists in being alone with the surplus jouissance and 
confronting the eclipse of the symbolic. If poverty was previously character-
ized as a minus, a lack, at present, from the perspective of the surplus jouis-
sance and its objects, it is considered to be a place of the excess and condensa-
tion of jouissance, call it drugs, weapons, games, etc. What characterizes the 
contemporary poverty of the capitalist discourse, is, ultimately, the poverty of 
the consumer, even an excessive consumer, because the consumer is the one 
who has been deprived of everything. Hence, we are not dealing here with the 
excluded any longer, i.e. those who could only lose their chains, since today, 
from the viewpoint of the surplus jouissance, there can always be something 
else to lose. Thus, as has been stated by Ernesto Laclau, the so-called ‘class 
struggle’ cannot be thought within the domain of its mere endogenous and 
automatic working; it demands, first of all, consent to reject the terms of ex-
ploitation, since it is not an immanent dynamics, but an act capable of invent-
ing a subject outside the strategies of the capitalist exploitation. 
c) Pretending to naturalize the exploitation under the pretext that there is 
no ‘distributive justice’ is, as we have already mentioned, a rejection of the 
absolute difference. The absence of distributive justice, as Lacan claims, 
rather implies that within the common a dimension that is irreducible to the 
calculation of the value will always exist. Perhaps the psychoanalyst may 
be in charge of protecting this place, since the common is what cannot be 
exchanged as a value, namely, the lalangue in which every speaking being 
finds his or her sinthomatic place. 
Hence, it can always be suggested that the analyst should avoid expressing 
an utterance of his/her political or social ideology; in short, he/she should 
not show off his/her Master signifiers, as this is required by the very logic of 
the direction of the cure.
Nonetheless, the ‘ideology’ returns in everybody, after even through the use 
of the Lacanian formulas that, as we have said before, constitute a basis for a 
new style of lay conservatism or for an ironical adoption of the semblances of 
tradition. If, however, we seek to act on the real within the cure, the problem 
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of how the ‘absent foundation’ becomes a cause must be emphasized once 
more. Assuming that the ‘absent foundation’ of the ‘non relation’ as a cause 
could constitute the condition for a School considered as an ‘operational base 
of the discontents of civilization’, a solution formulated by Lacan, appears to 
be even more daring than the expression ‘Lacanian left’.
The rhetorical figures of the saint, the committed warrior, the decided work-
er, constitute Lacan’s various attempts to elaborate what the operation of the 
subject consists in when it places itself beyond the level of identifications. 
They are sinthomatic names of the ‘being there’ in political action.  
At the same time, we will insist that this beyond is always grounded in a 
‘not-all’ logic, which, even when Lacan formulates it as if it belonged to the 
feminine, should not be mixed up with any kind of gender identity. 
Whereas both the logic of the all and of the masculine exception always call 
for the restoration of a new Master signifier that guarantees the order of the 
‘for-all’, the ‘not-all’, which could account for the emancipatory moment, 
constitutes itself in a relationship with the others that only retroactively, af-
ter the contingent invention of a new limit, gives us its true transformative 
reach.
d) The left cannot be utopian since the emergence of the analytic discourse, 
as there will never be a constituent reconciled with itself and without frac-
tures. It cannot be revolutionary, since there is no break that would allow for 
everything to start again, if such an event occurred eventually, it can only 
be considered as a sign of the efficacy of the death drive, and since it cannot 
be progressist, its time will be that of the ‘future anterior’: ‘what I will have 
been, for what I am going to be’. Dealing with the return of the past without 
nostalgia and with the energy of what is coming: is not this the war wagered 
against desire?
So in order to finish with this thorny question, knowing that there are still 
many interesting readings related to the final part of Lacan’s teaching, we 
will allow ourselves a quasi-ontological digression that will bring together 
the previous aspects of our elaboration in all its complexity.   
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In Lacan’s teaching, the common never appears as an immutable essence, 
it always emerges from ‘there is not’, it has no other solution other than ap-
pearing either as the ‘all’ and the ‘exception in the masculine logic’ or as the 
‘feminine not-all’. In this sense, the common emerges from an ontology of a 
one which is always fractured, failed, as Laclau would say. The common we 
are dealing with here cannot be supported axiomatically by means of the 
simple communist hypothesis whereby ‘every speaking being is the same as 
any other speaking being’, as that hypothesis demands, in order to be pro-
posed at all, a reference to the totality under its axiomatic form. The sinthom-
atic common, the common such as solitude presented until now, is originally 
exposed to the vicissitudes of the differences between the all, the exception, 
and the not-all. These logical modalities, as is known, were elaborated by 
Lacan as a response to the impossibility of the sexual relationship, and are 
known as the formulas of sexuation.
The masculine ‘for-all’ is not equality, because it is a universal that is sup-
ported by a radical exclusion that functions as a constitutive exception, an 
exception outside the law that, at the same time, constitutes it for all. From 
this masculine logic, we can grasp different realities in its phenomenology, 
which we will illustrate in the following examples: the exceptional tyrant 
who supports as a limit the bureaucracy of the ‘for-all’; the intelligence serv-
ice outside the rules of the game of the for-all democratic universe; the dead-
ly and obscene superego hidden in the exercise of symbolic law; the hero as 
a man of exception who condenses, in his singularity, the cause of a mass 
movement; the lover who, with his law of the heart, proclaims his singular-
ity as a universal law; the proletariat constituting a part of the whole and, at 
the same time, being the future messiah, the part of those without a part; the 
new god different from the ontotheological tradition, or the present financial 
coup in Europe that, in a new state of exception, suspends the democratic 
rules of the game. These disordered examples in their radical heterogeneity 
are meant to show why in his day Lacan stated that thought spontaneously 
and inevitably strives for the ‘for-all’. As if it were an iron law of thinking that 
leads us to grasp, in any discursive reality, a neverending game between the 
whole/all and the exception. Thus, despite the fact that examples may be 
quite varied and open, nevertheless they are governed by that logic. 
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It is clear that if common only manifests itself through these modalities, it is 
impossible not to have them, and the dream of its elimination is useless and 
dangerous. Nevertheless, we should continue to wonder about Lacan‘s last 
teaching, in which he tried to elaborate his shocking ‘woman does not exist’ 
formula as a universal, presenting this difficult and elusive logical modality 
of not-all, which, on many occasions, is confused and slides spontaneously 
in its interpretation towards the logic of the incompleteness of the whole/all 
and the exception.
There is no way of introducing the not-all without its inevitable reference 
to the whole/all and the exception. Nonetheless, it is in the domain of the 
not-all that we can think of this enigmatic ‘x’ of a process of subjectivization 
of the political that is not, from the outset, limited to the identifications that 
totalize it. 
In the ‘not-all’, although the subject is referred, from the beginning, to the 
phallologocentric law that constitutes it, as the formula itself indicates, not 
all ‘x’ is governed by the function of the law; this allows us to think of a rela-
tionship of the subject with the real outside the law. With this part of the real 
outside the law, perhaps the subject may put into play an invention of the 
social link, ‘a love without boundaries’, as was expressed by Lacan, a new 
kind of will which is gained neither by the identifications of the ideal of the 
ego, nor by the deadly circuits of the superego. Since it is about the real out-
side the law, we cannot deal with this real through the transgression of the 
law; the transgression is characteristic of the masculine logic of the limit and 
its crossing. In the unlimited not-all, it is about the contingent invention of 
a limit that does not proceed from the universal of for-all, but from the com-
mon of lalangue. This invention takes place each time, through temporary 
processes, an invention, even minimal, sets a limit which is not foreseen by 
the programme.
Although these reflections may be considered as an irrelevant drift with respect 
to our attempt to think of the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics, 
especially the politics which is always driven and besieged through its urgent 
conditions, it is in our own experience as analysands where we can return to 
those marks of the determined heritage and legacy that provides us with the 
only pertinent way of finding the urgent answer.
